Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe EU is in a state of culture shock. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the European Zeitenwende placed the EU in a largely unfamiliar international environment for which its past modes of operation and behavioural patterns are unsuited. The EU was able to geopolitically repurpose its existing processes and instruments to cope rather effectively with the challenges of the war and its global fallout. However, the EU is also faced with more fundamental questions related to how it will navigate a much more competitive international environment. For effective and sustainable answers, it will need to develop a joint strategic culture.

The term strategic autonomy has become a major reference point in the debates on the EU as a global actor despite concerns of some Member States that worry about global decoupling signals. What explains the attractiveness and widespread use of the concept in the EU's policy debates? This article puts forward an explanation grounded in social factors and dynamics. It uses role theory to develop a hypothesis for the proliferation of the strategic autonomy concept in the debate on EU's global role. Based on this perceptive, the conflict between the EU's roles as a market-, normative-, and realist power is at the heart of the emergence of the strategic autonomy discourse. Rather than forcing the EU to adapt its role as an international actor, the reference to strategic autonomy allows for 'role ambiguity'. The article discusses this in light of the current debates on the 'geopolitical Commission', qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as well as in the area of defence. Whether the ambiguity – the lack of clarity and certainty the EU as a collective actor faces with regards to the enactment of its role – will prove to be constructive or destructive for its foreign policy remains still open.
Strategic Autonomy, European Union, EU's Global Role, Role theory, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Common Security and Defence Policy, Normative Power, Market Power, Realist Power

In recent years, difficult relations with Russia and the instability of the Southern Mediterranean have presented the EU and NATO with new challenges. They both put a stronger emphasis on countering hybrid threats, territorial defence and counterterrorism. In the course of this development, the EU and NATO have deepened their cooperation at staff level, while failing to harmonize their basic political and strategic objectives. EU Member States do not yet share a common understanding of the role of the EU and NATO in European defence. The EU could align the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), incorporated in the Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), more closely with the objectives of NATO. This would be in line with the German idea of an inclusive EU defence policy.

Die schwierigen Beziehungen zu Russland und die Instabilität des südlichen Mittelmeerraums haben die EU und die Nato in den vergangenen Jahren gleichermaßen vor neue Aufgaben gestellt. Beide fokussieren sich stärker auf die Abwehr von hybriden Bedrohungen, die territoriale Verteidigung und die Terrorismusbekämpfung. Im Zuge dieser Entwicklung haben die EU und die Nato ihre Zusammenarbeit auf Mitarbeiterebene vertieft, ohne jedoch ihre grundsätzlichen politischen und strategischen Zielsetzungen in Einklang zu bringen. Bisher haben die EU-Mitgliedstaaten keine einheitliche Auffassung zur Rolle der EU und der Nato in der europäischen Verteidigung. Die EU könnte die Ständige Strukturierte Zusammenarbeit (PESCO) in der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (GSVP) enger an den Zielen der Nato ausrichten. Dies würde der deutschen Idee einer inklusiven EU-Verteidigungspolitik entgegenkommen.

This study argues that the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is a constrained agent of Europe's foreign policy. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty reform created the remodelled version of the High Representative of the Union as a potentially powerful agent to represent and coordinate Europe's foreign policy. However, the analysis shows how and why the member states granted only limited discretion to the new foreign policy actor during the first years of the post's existence. The aim of the study is to reveal the conditions of discretion of the High Representative. With the use of a principal-agent (PA) approach, the study shows that conflicting preferences of the member states, tight control mechanisms, as well as inadequate cooperation with the European Commission limited the High Representative's room for manoeuvre. The findings suggest that the PA approach can be developed further in the future in order to better explain limited discretion of agents in matters of foreign policy. Based on the findings, the study also puts forward a number of characteristics of a 'constrained agent'. It is suggested that the post of High Representative has the potential to emancipate from its status of a constrained agent over time, and to gain credibility as a foreign policy actor.